domaintools.com

We saw that in order to develop the clearest possible picture of a malicious campaign, it is necessary to enrich the log data already available, in order to glean metadata that can help for the basis for connections that illuminate the larger structures that we glimpsed at first in the form of a single domain or IP address. If the document generated by step 4 included the values that had interesting pivot counts, then it might look something like this (incidentally, “MXIP” is the IP address of the Mail Exchanger, or email server, associated with the domain): The domain occert[.]email was reported to a security trust group within a month or so of its creation; a playbook step to select-out domains older than, say, 90 days, would have included this domain at the time of its use in a phishing campaign, but might have trimmed down what the analyst had to pay attention to by discarding other domains that had been around longer. With a few minutes in the Iris UI, the analyst could run the pivot on the IP and MXIP values for the occert[.]email domain, then do the following filtering:

The third and fourth questions, about whether the domain is part of a larger campaign, are what propel investigations where the analyst “pivots” on attributes such as IP addresses, name servers, or registration details, to find other domains (and their associated hosting infrastructure) that may be under the same control as the domain that originally was flagged. The Simple Path: Playbooks for Enrichment and Basic Hunting Enrichment of domain data from the protected environment is a foundational activity; it’s something that just about every shop does in one form or another, and as a DomainTools user, chances are you’re enriching indicators seen in your environment in the form of domains or IP addresses. Here is what the IP address section of an Enrich API response looks like: Notice the word “count” in this response: the IP address in question has a count of 3, so there are 3 domains that the DomainTools Iris dataset has seen on that IP. look at where the analyst takes over from the playbook, such as when the Iris Guided Pivots Playbook delivers a set of infrastructure that could represent a campaign connected to a domain that was flagged by the enrichment/thresholding playbook.

you have been recived from me; fake = cloned web pages parent folder = folder which contain all files, after unzip ; cfg = file "config.json" located on 'parent folder'; uadmin link = link to uAdmin panel, for reciving logs from 'fake'; step = single step with html form and inputs/fields collection, used for request information from client; 777 where {parent_folder_name} is name of your 'parent folder' -If page is 'token page' than after connect to 'uadmin' -go to token page on uadmin -find connected page with green dot -press "save" on pop up box -press "save" on current page -go back to o-panel after this you will be able to see commands set for current page Analyzing the man.txt file, we can see that the customer receives their order in the form of a .zip file and that the file contains code that creates a single-step front-end login page that emulates a legitimate institution The author of the code provides a way to connect the fake token page to a customer-controlled administrative control panel, known as “uadmin,” or the “Universal Admin Panel.

Although historical China Chopper use is associated with threats physically located in China, subsequent disclosures and widespread availability mean, as noted by researchers at Cisco Talos, that: While initial access vectors to victims included the exploitation of four zero day vulnerabilities until disclosure on 02 March 2021, this activity concluded with deployment of a commodity, widely known webshell capability. While this reporting indicates that PRC-related entities are tied to Exchange exploitation activity, ESET’s analysis and telemetry shows that such activity started on 28 February 2021 at the earliest, with most entities commencing exploitation following Microsoft’s public release. Given these observations, while PRC-linked entities appear to be targeting the set of vulnerabilities since disclosure, it remains unclear with any degree of certainty what entities were doing so prior to late February 2021. Since 27 February 2021 and especially following public disclosure by Microsoft on 02 March 2021, multiple additional entities have opportunistically leveraged these vulnerabilities as part of multiple, independent campaigns.