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Sociologist. Emeritus Prof, UCL, and Visiting Prof, Surrey University; theory, politics, health, sport, jazz, art; atheist, republican, socialist. Own views.
In the last blog in this seemingly interminable series I drew on Bokadi and Goldthorpe’s excellent research to show the changes of absolute social mobility over the course of my lifetime (I was born in 1948). Their initial stab is: ‘ … it may be sufficient (as a starting point) to think of relative rates as ones that ‘compare the chances’ of individuals of different class origins being found in different class destinations, and that thus reflect social processes which, as they operate within the class structure, generate the absolute rates that are actually observed. Rather than focusing on employers’ recruitment practices, focusing on their promotion practices might show a greater return: ‘that is, with the aim of discouraging credentialism that effectively blocks promotion from below for those without some, perhaps quite arbitrarily determined, level of qualification, and of encouraging the wider development of internal promotion programmes and associated training provision.’ • Political and policy identifications of social mobility ‘cold spots’ in different parts of the country This change is primarily the result of the course of development of the class structure – in particular, of the slowing down of the previous rate of growth of the managerial and professional salariat.’ This precis does scant justice to what I regard as outstanding sociological research on the part of Budoki, Goldthorpe and colleagues (and there are always colleagues).
This asserts that: ‘people’s definitions of self, situation and orientation to social change mirror the Mertonian status- and role-sets they occupy. what becomes familiar matters more, more insistently structures agency and is more causally efficacious than is often appreciated … the activity reinforcement model here points to a tendency for the repetition-cum-familiarity associated with status- and role-set occupancy to translate into a behavioural predictability beyond the conscious reach of ego adjustment.’ As an aside it strikes me that both models have relevance for the behaviour of MPs debating Brexit in the House of Commons. By human malleability I refer to the facility we (all) seem to have to accommodate Gestalt-like switches – that is, replacing one outlook, orientation, even world view, with another – independently of our interests. Perhaps this kind of malleability – because I’m sure there are others in an extended family of poorly understood frailties of human reasoning – could be called the roulette phenomenon (gambling on narratives by a spin of the wheel).
She specified six components of erotic capital: (a) beauty, (b) sexual attractiveness, (c) social attractiveness, (d) vivaciousness and energy, (e) presentation and (f) sexuality. It might in fact have been better handled by a scholar more keen on investigating the variable properties and reach of what she terms erotic capital by time and place and less keen on evangelising on its behalf (promoting it as a way women in particular can ‘use it’ or ‘fight back’). As far as sexual capital is concerned, research has found that in the USA white, middle-class men have more resources and opportunities for sexual engagement than, for example, working-class black women; and in Australia white, middle-class, educated women reported more sexual partners (and orgasms) than working-class, less educated men from migrant backgrounds. More generally, I note that women, and to a lesser extent men, do in fact use Hakim’s erotic capital to further their agendas and interests, but I do not accept her positive commendation of women’s strategic use of erotic capital;
In an excellent new book by Erzsebet Bukodi and John Goldthorpe, entitled Social Mobility and Education in Britain, the class (as defined by NS-SEC) distributions of economically active men and women are calculated at the census years of 1951, 1971, 1991 and 2011. In 1951 the wage-earning working class, as represented by NS-SEC Classes 6 and 7, was predominant, accounting for well over half the active male population. The three intermediate classes, NS-SEC Classes 3, 4 and 5, remain more stable in size, although some slight decline is indicated in the proportion of men in Class 3, that of employees in ancillary professional and administrative occupations. The one major difference from men comes with NS-SEC Class 3 which between 1951 and 1971 expanded so as to account for over a third of the active female population but then contracted so as to account for only a quarter by 2011 – a reflection chiefly of the rise and fall of the office secretary and typist.’ If its not too esoteric or rude, I’d like to include a table.